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1 Introduction  
Short-termism has been identified as a significant barrier to achieving corporate 
sustainability, both in Australia and globally. The Total Environment Centre’s (TEC) Green 
Capital Program has instigated a project to consider the problem of short-termism with the 
following objectives: 
 To raise the issue of short-termism as a barrier to corporate sustainability 
 To identify causes and solutions to short-termism 
 To promote the uptake of solutions in Australian business 
Green Capital has commissioned The Institute for Sustainable Futures (ISF) to research 
causes of, and solutions to, short-termism in the finance sector. The research involves 
desktop review of literature and two focus groups with Australian investment community 
stakeholders. ISF has not undertaken original empirical or theoretical research. The 
literature review includes consideration of relevant theoretical and empirical evidence, but 
is not a comprehensive theoretical review. 
In undertaking this research, we have accepted the underlying premise of the project as set; 
that short-termism has a causal relationship to unsustainability. It should be noted, 
however, that this view could itself be a question for research. For example, short-termism 
could alternatively be a symptom rather than a cause of unsustainability. In our view, the 
causal relationship premise is supported by the fact that corporate sustainability1[1], is 
generally associated with investments that have a relatively long payoff period and may not 
have a positive impact on company market valuation in the immediate future (and indeed 
could have a negative impact in the short-term). If the investment sector has a short-term 
outlook, therefore, initiatives to improve sustainability are less likely to get off the ground. 
Companies seeking to improve the sustainability of their business have expressed 
frustration at the constraints imposed by short-termism in the market. As we shall see, 
empirical research provides evidence of the operation of such constraints (whether real or 
perceived). 
The outputs from this research project are: two discussion papers - one covering causes of 
short-termism and the other covering solutions to short-termism; and an Action Plan. The 
purpose of the discussion papers and Action Plan is to stimulate debate about short-termism 
and to lay the foundations for addressing short-termism in the Australian finance sector. 
This paper discusses causes of short-termism in the finance sector. It should be read in 
conjunction with the second discussion paper Solutions to Short-termism in the Finance Sector 
and the Action Plan Paradigm Shift to Long-termism. Comments from the first of the two 
project focus groups are incorporated in this paper. The focus group is referred to hereafter 
in this paper as “the first project focus group”. 
In July 2005, The Conference Board Global Corporate Governance Research Center held a 
Corporate/Investor Summit in London that convened some of the most distinguished 
representatives from the corporate and investment worlds, to explore the debate on market 
                                                       
1 Corporate sustainability is defined by the Australian Government as follows: “Corporate 
sustainability encompasses strategies and practices that aim to meet the needs of stakeholders today 
while seeking to protect, support and enhance the human and natural resources that will be needed 
in the future.” 
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short-termism. The report from the Summit identifies three major ‘links’ in the investment 
short-termism ‘chain’ [2]: 
 The investor link 
 The analyst link 
 The corporate link  
The analysis of causes of short-termism that follows covers both systemic factors and factors 
impacting on the key links in the investment short-termism chain (as identified by the 
Conference Board Summit delegates). Firstly, we look at what is meant by short-termism 
and why short-termism is a problem. 
2 What is short-termism? 
In an adaptation of Marginson and McAulay’s definition, we define short-termism as a 
preference for actions in the near-term without due consideration of the long-term 
consequences [3]. 
Determining what is short- and long-term is subjective. Sustainability practitioners tend to 
think of long-term as many years into the future. The International Panel on Climate 
Change, for example, reports on scenarios to 2100. By contrast, in financial markets, where 
decisions are made minute-by-minute, the time horizon of participants can be incredibly 
short – less than a day even. From this perspective therefore, anything from 3 to 10 years can 
seem long-term. In the UK, a consultation by the Marathon Club discussed long-term 
mandates and described the following timescales,  
By short-term we mean periods of between three months…and three years…By long-
term…we mean for periods of longer than three years, typically between five and ten years, 
or the length of the business and market cycles [4]. 
As this research centres on financial markets, we have accepted the Marathon Club premise 
of less than 3 years as short-term. The following analysis is undertaken in this context. 
3 Why is short-termism a problem? 
There are numerous analyses that explain why short-termism is problematic. We have 
identified the following consequences of short-termism: 
 Depression of economic development and destruction of long-term value through: 
o undermining confidence in the soundness of the underlying economy [2]; and 
o lack of long-term outlook and investment within companies - building long 
term market share has become a secondary objective to maintaining short-
term share prices [5].  
 Failure to adequately account for and invest in long-term environmental, social and 
economic sustainability. Short-termism favours immediate financial returns. The long-
term costs of unsustainability therefore tend to be ignored in favour of minimising short-
term costs and maximising short-term profits. In the long-term, this could lead to 
society- and economy-wide destruction of value. For example: 
o The economic logic of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ suggests that, in the 
absence of a regulating authority, self-interested independent agents will seek 
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short-term personal gain at the expense of the long-term welfare of all. Over-
exploitation can destroy long-term value. An example of this is the collapse of 
commercial cod fisheries. The pressure to maximise short-term profit by 
increasing supply and reducing costs has led to over-fishing and subsequent 
collapse of cod stocks. Conversely, a long-term approach that factored in 
sustainable fishing practices could have sustained the long-term economic, 
environmental and social value of the resource. Long-term economic 
prosperity depends on maintenance of environmental and social capital, but 
short-termism is undermining these forms of capital; 
o Economic theory recognises that externalities (costs that are not paid for by 
participants in a transaction) are a sign of market failure. The cost of 
externalities may be temporally and spatially distant from the market 
transactions that give rise to them. This distance means that externalities do 
not factor in decision-making. Regulation, such as ‘polluter pays’, attempts to 
address externalities. However, companies that voluntarily go beyond 
compliance in incorporating externalities may be punished by the market if 
their costs increase in the short-term relative to other companies. Climate 
change is an example of an externality. The Stern Review on the Economics of 
Climate Change demonstrates that action now to prevent climate change is 
significantly less costly than meeting the future costs of the consequences of 
climate change. However, short-termism does not promote preventive action 
as there may be an increase in near-term business costs. Externalities can 
therefore result in economy-wide resource inefficiency; and 
o Despite evidence that investment in triple bottom line sustainability can lead 
to long-term economic benefits for individual companies (for example by 
reducing operating costs and insurance premiums, strengthening brand 
equity, reputation, human capital and alliances [6]) the upfront costs of 
implementing initiatives can be a deterrent to investment. At an economy-
wide level, short-term pressure to minimise costs can also result in failure to 
invest in necessary long-term measures, such as infrastructure maintenance 
and replacement. As with externalities, the long-term costs of failure to invest 
are likely to be greater than the immediate costs of investment. 
 Reduced investment returns [7]: 
o Firing fund managers due to poor relative short-term performance can 
destroy value [8], as performance is cyclical. Evidence suggests that trustees 
tend to replace poorly performing fund managers at the point at which 
performance improves and appoint new managers that are doing well at the 
point at which their performance declines [8]. Costs associated with hiring 
and firing managers – such as loss of knowledge and intellectual capital - are 
poorly understood; and 
o There are costs associated with the trading system itself. So the more frequent 
the trading, the more costs offset returns [8]. 
 Damage to market credibility [2]; 
 Lack of long-term relationships between investors and companies (The State We’re In, 
Will Hutton, 1995 cited in [8]); 
 Marginalisation of the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders; 
 Market inefficiency [7]; 
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 Impediments to efforts to strengthen corporate governance [7]. Corporate executives 
may behave irresponsibly to achieve immediate gains for which they are rewarded; 
 Macro-incentives for companies to move to private markets to avoid earnings guidance 
pressure [7] thereby reducing accountability. However, reduction of agency costs can 
also lead to economic improvements; 
 Growth through mergers and acquisitions rather than long-term organic growth. A 
report by the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in the UK argues that shareholders in target 
firms gain in the short-term, but at the expense of other stakeholders, especially 
employees, rather than as a result of greater efficiency. The TUC states that research 
shows that takeovers seldom improve long-term value [8]. However, not everyone 
agrees with this view and many see a positive role for mergers and acquisitions in the 
economic system; and 
 Greater market instability, due in part to the rise of speculative short-term investors, 
assisted by technological developments such as automatic program selling. 
Not everyone agrees that capital markets are biased against long-term investment. Herde 
argues that although the market does require short-term results it is also interested in 
knowing a company’s long-term growth [9]. Marginson and McAulay question whether 
capital markets are myopic. They cite evidence that “positive returns have been found to be 
associated with the announcement of research and development projects” [3], thereby 
suggesting that “markets reward management decisions that are consistent with long-term 
value creation” [3]. The market for environmentally and socially responsible investment is 
now expanding rapidly and business consideration of sustainability factors appears to be on 
the rise, perhaps indicating a growing acknowledgement of the importance of long-term 
performance. Marginson and McAulay represent the contradictions as a dialectic debate in 
which one view is that capital markets are myopic and the other is that markets are 
interested in long-term value but are confronted by managerial short-termism [3].  
Nonetheless, the bulk of the literature suggests that short-termism is a characteristic of 
financial markets, not just a feature of managerial behaviour, albeit greatly contributed to by 
the behaviour of, and pressures exerted on, individual market participants. 
The first project focus group discussed short-termism as the dominant paradigm in the 
finance sector. However, it was suggested that there may be rational reasons for this and a 
short-term outlook itself is not necessarily a problem. Indeed a degree of short-termism is 
needed for market liquidity and actions are needed in the short-term to resolve problems. 
Good decisions can be made from a short-term perspective and not all decisions made from 
a long-term perspective are good decisions. In fact, some long-term investments in products 
and services, such as coal-fired power stations, may contribute to unsustainability. Likewise, 
certain sectors may be supported on the basis of presumed inherent environmental or social 
value, even though they may be poorly managed and have inadequate long-term business 
propositions and models. Apparently myopic decisions may therefore be justifiable as being 
in the best judicial long-term interests of the ultimate owner. 
The possibility was also raised that some decisions that appear short-termist may not be due 
to an inherently short-term outlook, but instead may arise purely because of inadequate 
assessment of the future. The group discussed the need for the market to cater for both 
short-term traders and long-term investors. The problem with the short-termism paradigm 
is that it restricts the ability of long-term investors and corporates to take decisions based on 
principles of long-term value creation rather than short-term performance expectations. 
Perhaps the appropriate framing, therefore, is not so much short-termism versus long-
termism. Maybe it is instead about quality of decision-making, which is largely dependent 
on quality of information flow, and creating space in the market for different investor types.  
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The focus group also discussed the possibility that the market may be vulnerable to a 
specific type of short-termism linked to social and environmental factors. The market has 
trouble incorporating factors that are difficult to price and around which there are major 
confidence intervals on potential outcomes, such as climate change.  
In summary, fixation with the short-term can undermine creation and maintenance of long-
term value and growth at an individual company level and at a societal level. Short-termism 
undermines sustainable development, as sustainability requires consideration of long-term 
impacts. The Conference Board concludes that short-termism “encourages opportunistic 
behaviours by a few to the detriment of the many” [2]. Short-termism is a problem for 
financial markets because it restricts long-term investment. In seeking to create a paradigm 
shift, however, the finance sector needs ensure that poor short-term decisions are not simply 
replaced with poor long-term decisions. 
The remainder of the paper examines causes of short-termism in the finance sector. 
4 Systemic causes of short-termism 
4.1 Reporting and communications 
Reporting and disclosure have been identified as key factors contributing to short-termism 
in financial markets. The problems with reporting can be roughly categorised as: 
 The nature, or content, of reporting/disclosure; and 
 Market reaction to reporting/disclosure. 
4.1.1 Disclosure content 
Annual reports 
Mandatory annual reporting focuses on providing narrow financial information, largely 
ignoring extra-financial indicators such as human resources management, the environment, 
corporate ethics and stakeholder relations. Assuming that what gets measured gets 
managed, current disclosure requirements reinforce a narrow business focus on short-term 
financial capital only, at the expense of other forms of capital. As discussed above, 
consideration of extra-financial factors is important for the long-term value and growth of 
individual businesses, the economy and society-wide sustainability. 
Financial reporting is therefore criticized for providing insufficient information to investors 
and other stakeholders to enable them to make decisions about a company’s true long-term 
value drivers. The Conference Board reports that 75% of a company’s market value consists 
of intangible assets and expectations of future growth that are not captured in its accounting 
book value, so annual reports are unlikely to adequately disclose the major value drivers of 
performance [2]. The CFA Institute criticises reporting for being legalistic and providing 
only ‘boilerplate’ analysis, rather than providing helpful information to investors about a 
company’s long-term prospects. 
Companies and analysts are comfortable with the tangible and familiar reporting of 
financials. By contrast, reporting of non-financial indicators can be complex - it is often 
difficult to value and account for intangibles. In the absence of regulation, this has led to an 
ad-hoc approach and inconsistent reporting of long-term risks and value. Nonetheless, 
attempts are being made on both a voluntary level and through regulation to address the 
deficiencies of traditional financial reporting. A 2005 KPMG survey found, for example, that 
24% of Australia’s top 500 companies now produce sustainability reports [10].  
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Earnings 
In addition to annual reporting, ASX listed companies are required to announce earnings for 
the past period every 6 months. Companies also provide guidance on future earnings. In the 
US and UK, earnings are disclosed and guidance given quarterly. Under ‘continuous 
disclosure’ rules, Australian listed companies are also required to immediately announce to 
the market any events that are likely to have a material effect on their share price. Graham et 
al suggest that earnings per share is the predominant measure of success because it is a 
simple metric that summarises corporate performance, is easy to understand and relatively 
comparable. It enjoys wide media coverage and provides a single number for analysts and 
investors to use to predict the future [5]. 
As with annual reporting, however, the nature of earnings reporting is criticised for being 
too narrow and not providing adequate information to investors and analysts to assess long-
term value. The nature of earnings reporting reinforces a short-term market focus by 
encouraging investors and analysts to concentrate their assessments on short-term measures 
rather than long-term drivers. Alfred Rappaport, of Northwestern University Kellogg 
Graduate School of Management ,who has developed alternative performance metrics (such 
as the Corporate Performance Statement), believes that “neither last year’s earnings nor next 
year’s earnings provide much help in gauging the magnitude, timing and uncertainty of 
future cash flows…By combining yesterday’s accomplishments and tomorrow’s 
uncertainties, accountants produce a bottom line that doesn’t tell investors what they need 
know” [11]. 
The first project focus group discussed the concern that analysts, working on the best 
available information, have nonetheless left out half the picture by focusing only on 
financial measures. Concerns were also expressed about what is measurable and what isn’t 
and the inherent uncertainty in predicting the future. One participant suggested that too 
much faith is placed in the accuracy of short-term measurements, “all the assumptions that 
are used, even in very short-term modelling, they’re immense and actually not that 
measurable”. Therefore, it is perhaps a fallacy to believe that analysis of the short-term 
achieves greater measurability than analysis that also incorporates long-term measures. 
4.1.2 Reaction to missed earnings targets 
Marginson and McAulay contend that the nature of accounting measurement itself is of less 
significance than the importance attached to it [3]. Recent research suggests that the 
importance the market attaches to reported earnings has a profound effect on the actions of 
corporate managers.  
Graham et al surveyed more than 400 executives to determine the factors that drive reported 
earnings and disclosure decisions. The results reveal that corporate managers fear 
retribution from the stock market for failing to meet earnings targets because the market 
uses short-term performance to gauge certainty about future prospects of the firm. Missed 
targets and earnings volatility can lead to a dip in stock price because the market regards 
these as indicative of higher risk. As a result, CFOs are pressured to manage earnings at the 
expense of longer-term objectives [5]. The study finds strong evidence that “managers take 
real economic actions to meet or beat earnings in preference to accounting actions.” [5]. 
Long-term value creation is often sacrificed. 80% of managers interviewed claimed that they 
would, for example, “decrease discretionary expenditure on R&D, advertising and 
maintenance”. CFOs see meeting market expectations as a necessary evil [5].  
The first project focus group discussed the role of disclosure as a driver of short-termism. 
Some see the requirements for companies to disclose earnings and super funds to disclose 
performance, as a cause of short-termism. Participants noted that rating agencies add to the 
pressure on super funds. However, information flow was seen as important for market 
Institute for Sustainable Futures, UTS July 2007 
 
Causes of short-termism in the finance sector 7 
 
efficiency. Less frequent information may contribute to greater market shocks and over-
reactions. 
It was suggested that market reactions to earnings announcements are perhaps more 
rational than implied – a short-term announcement can be a good predictor of a long-term 
valuation change. Market reactivity can lead to better operation of the market. However, it 
was agreed that the “culture of hyperactivity” in the market is unhelpful. The role of 
investor relations is to smooth market anxiety and curb waves of over-optimism and over-
insecurity. 
As discussed here and below, the adverse reaction of the market to missed earnings targets 
impacts the entire investment chain - fund managers, analysts and companies. The TUC 
report concludes that unless there is a fundamental change in the manner in which the stock 
markets perceive small misses from earnings benchmarks, the pressure that CFOs feel to 
manage earnings is unlikely to go away. “Business leaders feel unable to make long-term 
decisions because shareholders are looking for short-term relative performance” [8]. 
4.2 Regulation 
Regulation can either encourage or discourage short-termism:  
The Conference Board reports on legislative changes in the US in the 1970s that changed the 
landscape of capital markets in the US and elsewhere. These included regulatory changes 
that enabled wealth accumulation in pension funds and taxation policies that encouraged 
short-term investment strategies [2].  
In Australia, the introduction of super fund member choice has heightened short-term 
performance pressure for institutional investors. Funds are now in competition for members 
seeking high returns in the short-term. The general shift from individual to institutional 
investors has given rise to disconnection between ownership and control. Individuals 
invested through a super fund are removed from shareholder ownership responsibilities – 
ownership is exercised (or not exercised) on their behalf by institutional investors. So even if 
an individual shareholder is interested in issues other than short-term profit maximisation, 
it is difficult for them to exercise their ownership rights. Short-termism in the finance sector 
has generally not been a focus of campaigning and awareness-raising by the NGO sector. 
There has therefore been little community pressure for change either at the regulatory level 
or through shareholder activism. This is likely to have contributed to decreased corporate 
accountability. The effects of a decrease (or perceived decrease) in accountability is 
evidenced in corporate scandals.  
The Conference Board report refers to the recent corporate scandals in the US as evidence of 
corporate culture contributing to short-termism – a culture that encouraged corporate 
executives to look after their own personal, and largely short-term interest, rather than to 
“generate sustainable benefits to all stakeholders”. Such excesses are now being addressed 
through more stringent regulation on corporate governance, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 and similar legislation in Europe. The study by Graham et al notes however that the 
current focus on corporate governance may be ineffective in addressing short-termism in 
corporate executives. The recent attention on improving corporate governance centres on 
manipulative accounting, but research indicates that the focus needs to be expanded to “the 
real business decisions of managers” [5]. It should also be noted that the whole question of 
governance and internal power relations is a widely debated field, subject to considerable 
academic and corporate discussion, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The first project focus group discussed corporate governance mechanisms. It was 
acknowledged that there has been a degree of “clubbiness” between corporate managers 
and fund managers on governance issues. A comment was also made about the quality of 
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voting mechanisms; many AGM votes are lost or misdirected, indicating that there are 
operational issues to be addressed. 
As noted above, reporting regulations in Australia have not, to date, required reporting of 
extra-financial factors, and the focus on narrow financial measures rather than long-term 
value and sustainability has encouraged a short-term outlook. There is also no regulated 
requirement for company directors to take account of the interests of stakeholders other 
than shareholders. The Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee’s (CAMAC) 
December 2006 report on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Australia concluded that 
there is no need to change the Companies Act to require directors to do so because: 
…the established formulation of directors duties allows directors sufficient flexibility to take 
relevant interests and broader community considerations into account” [12].  
Allowing flexibility, however, does not guarantee that other stakeholder interests will be 
considered. Creation and maintenance of long-term environmental, social and economic 
value is important, not just for business itself, but for the welfare of society. 
Some regulation already exists to protect the interests of other stakeholders and to address 
externalities. Increasing environmental pressures suggest however, that current regulation is 
insufficient to address externalities such as climate change and over-exploitation of common 
resources, such as oceans. In the absence of adequate regulation, incentives to maximise 
short-term profit continue to override broader, long-term interests. 
4.3 Speculation 
A number of reports have drawn attention to the contribution of speculation to short-
termism, particularly hedge funds. According to a report by The Evening Standard in 
London cited by the TUC, there is widespread concern that hedge funds are: 
…turning the place into a casino where genuine long-term investors and companies are 
overwhelmed by their superior financial resources… Meanwhile they simply devastate the 
morale of managements who see share price movements that bear no connection to the work 
they are actually putting into a business[8]. 
 However, studies have also shown that “many investee companies valued the business 
acumen of hedge funds, their contribution to market liquidity and their influence on 
complacent management” [8]. 
The Conference Board notes that speculation is not found only in hedge funds and 
derivatives trading, but also “in a large proportion of high-turnover portfolio managers 
ready to jump in and out of the market” [2]. The rise of speculative investors has been 
boosted by the availability of online trading, real-time stock price information, analysis and 
news. Speculative investors are not prepared to wait for long-term growth but instead make 
buy/sell decisions in minutes or seconds. Summit delegates were “unanimous in their belief 
that stock investment speculation is a major cause of market short-termism” [2].  
4.4 Education and experience 
There is a perception that the average participant in financial markets today is young and 
inexperienced [13]. Young analysts and fund managers who have not experienced a full 
business cycle may tend to over-react when a company misses an earnings target [5], 
contributing to pressure on companies to meet short-term targets. 
The Conference Board report cites evidence from a study sponsored by the UN Environment 
Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) and the World Business Council for Sustainable 
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Development which found that young analysts are typically uninformed about non-
financial issues and long-term sustainability concepts [8]. Financial educators such as 
business schools and professional bodies, do little to improve the situation, by focusing only 
on short-term and narrow financial performance metrics. The UNEP FI study concluded that 
“Young finance professionals are reluctant to learn of new methodologies to differentiate 
their analytical skills” (cited in [2]). In addition, training provided by financial services firms 
to analysts and fund managers is costly and highly specialised, with a focus on achieving 
short-term returns. This, coupled with short-term incentive structures means that the 
majority of finance professionals have neither the expertise nor the inclination to work to 
longer-term horizons [13]. 
The CFA Institute also highlights the issue of a lack of appropriate financial education, 
noting that overall financial education levels around the world are low. This is likely to 
mean that super fund beneficiaries are not fully aware of the consequences of short-termism 
in management of their funds. Lack of relevant training is a particular problem among 
pension fund trustees [7]. Investors may have inadequate knowledge and experience to 
properly assess long-term business and investment strategy and are increasingly influenced 
by information provided by the mainstream media. Trustees exert pressure for change and 
improved performance at short notice [14]. The CFA Institute report also comments that 
corporate managers may misinterpret how the market values their company and therefore 
place undue emphasis on short-term valuation measures such as earnings.  
4.5 Societal and behavioural factors 
Human behavioural and societal factors both influence, and provide insight into, short-
termism in the finance sector. Economic and political systems and institutions are locked 
into accepted behaviours and norms that are difficult to change as they require changes in 
deep-seated views and attitudes shared by a large number of people. This institutional 
inertia, along with social and technological developments over the last thirty years, has 
exacerbated the issue of short-termism. Governments working on short-term political cycles 
and focussing on re-election, tend to have a myopic view of issues and set short-term 
objectives rather than more visionary policies [15]. This applies to government regulation of 
the finance industry. The Australian cycle is more compressed than most. In 2000, Prime 
Minister John Howard acknowledged that “short-termism (is) forced on national politics by 
the maximum parliamentary term of three years.” [16]. 
At a cultural level, an increasingly materialistic society demands immediate returns and 
satisfaction. “…The increased pace of the world, the shortened time-frames within which 
we live longer, the shorter life-cycles of such things as markets, technology, products and 
employment tenure - the collapsing of time” [17] may have a causal link to the over-riding 
short-term mentality within society. The emergence of 24-hour news and channels dedicated 
to financial markets has increased scrutiny of the stock market, increasing performance 
pressure. In an increasingly globalised economy and society, the impacts of short-term stock 
market reactivity in one country can be experienced around the world. 
The first project focus group commented on short-termism not only in investment but in 
“everything we do”. A further issue identified by the focus group is the lack of investment 
in commercialisation of new technologies in Australia. Although there is excellent research, 
for example in medical technologies, environmental technology and through the university 
sector, it is perceived that there is inadequate public investment in commercialisation funds, 
and a lack of venture capital compared to overseas. Therefore there is insufficient structural 
support for long-term economic development. 
Human behavioural aspects also contribute to short-termism. Time affects an individual’s 
propensity to make appropriate and successful decisions – the longer the time horizon, “the 
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greater is the uncertainty and information is more likely to be deficient” [3]. Short term 
decision-making, therefore, feels more informed. Role ambiguity (the difference between the 
information a person needs to fulfil a role and the information available) also plays a part. 
Working to the short term can be a coping behaviour which can provide decision-makers 
with more clarity and structure [3].  
Individual market participants are also influenced by peer pressure from their inter- and 
intra-firm colleagues. “Short-termism, as the accepted way of doing things, can become 
legitimised as an accepted form of institutional behaviour” (Laverty, 1996 cited in [3]). 
Within organisations, there are pressures to conform to the existing system. Social 
interaction and communication within the firm can lead to a convergence of views and 
beliefs and this serves to perpetuate the focus on the short-term. Behaviour is reinforced by 
positive reactions to individuals acting according to generally accepted norms [3]). 
However, the outcome of peer pressure is highly dependent on the culture of the individual 
firm. Companies such as Fuji Xerox, for example, are heavily influenced by corporate values 
that are a fusion of short- and long-term. Further, as internal organisational boundaries 
diminish, inter-organisational influences may either increase or decrease short-term 
pressures [18]. 
Fund managers in particular are influenced by the relative performance of their rivals and 
by the expectations of their clients. Fund managers tend to function according to a ‘herd 
instinct’ due to the perceived (or actual) emphasis on relative performance. For example, 
investment behaviour during the technology, media and communications boom led to fund 
managers second-guessing their competitors rather than accurately analysing stocks. This 
compounded existing distortions and poor decision-making [8]. 
4.6 Performance assessment and incentives 
Throughout the investment chain, market participants are assessed and rewarded on the 
basis of short-term performance. This applies to fund managers, analysts and corporate 
executives. Assessment and rewards are key causative factors in short-termism, as discussed 
below. 
5 Causes of short-termism at the level of links in the 
chain 
5.1 The investor link 
5.1.1 Individual and institutional investors 
The predominant US/Anglo model of capitalism has contributed to the short-term outlook 
of the investment chain. The over-arching features of this business model are: “single-tiered 
boards focused on shareholder interests; dominant financial markets; weak role for banks; 
and little industrial/government policy.” (Reed, 2002 in [19]). Since maximising shareholder 
value became the key objective for most companies in the 1980s, organisations have been 
judged on a very short-term (often daily) basis. Investors seeking to maximise returns on 
their investments evaluate success or otherwise on the short term performance of funds. 
Short-term performance is seen as a less risky way to earn returns and investors churn their 
portfolios regularly to take advantage of minor adjustments in stock prices. Recent loss of 
trust in corporate leaders is likely to be a contributory factor to investor risk aversion, and 
technological development has assisted speculative investors, as discussed above.  
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Individual investors closely monitor the performance of their super funds and are likely to 
switch if they are under-performing. The limited timeframe they have in which to earn a 
return for retirement means that there is a perception that they cannot afford to wait and 
persevere with a less successful fund [8]. This puts short-term performance pressure on 
institutional investors. 
The first project focus group participants discussed the impact of a move from defined 
benefits to accumulation super funds and member choice. Retails investors are considered to 
be less reactive to poor performance than institutional investors. Nonetheless, super funds 
are concerned about losing members if short-term performance is poor. Accumulation funds 
have shifted risk, or at least made it more obvious who are the ultimate risk-bearers – fund 
beneficiaries. This was identified as a factor in increasing short-term performance pressure 
on superfunds. Individual fund beneficiaries may not be in a position to adopt a long-term 
view, specifically those approaching retirement age. It was suggested that younger investors 
may be more willing to ride out market fluctuations. There was also discussion about 
education of customers. It was noted that there have been significant advances in public 
understanding of market operations since the advent of super provision in the early ‘90s. 
The next stage of understanding – the benefits of long-term investment -may take some time 
to achieve. 
Pension fund trustees make decisions based on short-term performance figures. TUC 
research found that “trustees...overwhelmingly supported the proposition that they should 
be able to terminate fund managers’ mandates early” [8]. This, despite many disagreeing 
that they put too much pressure on fund managers to deliver short-term results. The most 
important factor to the pension fund is whether the fund manager is meeting trustees’ 
expectations and helping to fund the pension scheme. If returns are unsatisfactory, there is a 
tendency to change fund manager, rather than look at the investment strategy in more detail 
to evaluate the chances of longer-term success. 
The focus group noted that while large pension and super funds hold most of their equities 
over the long term, they also want the freedom to invest in short term investments if 
opportunities arise. Further, although such funds claim to be interested in the long-term 
perspective, the dominant perspective getting through to companies from investors is that of 
the short-term traders. The long-term investor message is not getting through the 
investment chain. Super funds may also be unwilling to unilaterally address short-termism 
and/or poor governance practices in the companies in which they invest because they are 
uncomfortable about being seen to take on companies alone. 
5.1.2 Fund managers 
Research by Li Jin at Harvard Business School concludes that the short investment horizons 
of fund managers are related positively to their investors’ short investment horizons. The 
research suggests that fund manager investment short-termism is caused by investor short-
termism, but not the other way round [20]. Even if their clients, the investors, claim not to 
evaluate performance in the short term, regular reviews and the importance placed on 
performance within these reviews sends a message to the fund managers that short-term 
performance is indeed important. 
Rob Brierley, a senior institutional adviser with Perth broker, Hartleys, blames fund 
manager performance assessment and rewards for short-termism,  
The performance of the average funds manager in Australia gets measured on a quarterly 
basis, so they can’t help but be fixated by investments with a time horizon of three to 12 
months…That then does not favour investment techniques which identify strategic or real 
long-term value [21]. 
Institute for Sustainable Futures, UTS July 2007 
 
Causes of short-termism in the finance sector 12 
 
Pension fund trustees rate performance as the most important issue on which they monitor 
fund managers (cited in [8]). Therefore, although the signals sent by trustees and investors 
may not be deliberate, fund managers nonetheless perceive pre-occupation with their short-
term performance. Some perceive the problem of short-termism to be even more acute in 
Australia than elsewhere. Simon Potter (Director of Hardman Resources) claims Australian 
fund managers and institutions are too focused on the short-term outlook and too risk 
averse compared to their international peers. They are “influenced by short-term cash flow 
issues. In comparison, UK analysts would look at the full life-cycle of the assets rather than 
the…near-term cash-flow, which is volatile and exposed to risk.” [21] 
Evidence suggests that it is rational for fund managers to be concerned about short-term 
performance. Li Jin’s research shows that mutual fund investors chase recent fund 
performance. Underperformance puts fund managers at risk of being fired. New fund flow 
is sensitive to performance and fund outflow constitutes automatic partial liquidation. 
Therefore, managers who focus on long-term payoff at the expense of short-term valuation 
might not survive to see the long-term profit realized, and even if they do, their assets might 
be substantially reduced [20].  
With fund managers rewarded for their analysis of, and investment in, the short-term, 
financial performance of companies, there is little incentive to evaluate the long-term, non-
financial projects that could create sustainable value. In Australia, fund managers tend to 
benchmark to indices and so are relative performance players [21]. When managers are 
compensated on relative performance, it gives them an incentive to sell stock when a peer 
starts selling. Relative compensation is believed to promote ‘bandwagon’ investing and 
unwillingness to hold stocks for the long-run [5]. Even if a fund manager is generating 
positive returns it can often be “safer to be wrong with the majority than to be right alone” 
[5], so fund managers tend to misallocate capital rather than follow their own instincts on 
investment strategies.   
The first project focus group discussed the importance of super funds sending the right 
signals to fund managers. Unless fund managers receive the message that super funds are 
committed to long-term value, behaviour will not change. Manager selection was also 
identified as an issue. It was noted that fund managers are selected and retained on the basis 
of short-term performance. 
5.2 The analyst link 
Analysts significantly contribute to the short-term nature of financial markets. They are 
rewarded for deal flow and so have an interest in generating activity rather than developing 
knowledge about long term value to inform investment decisions [2]. They tend to market 
popular stocks, rather than stocks that are mis-priced, and so contribute to the herd 
mentality [22]. 
Short-term earnings dominate analysis. This is self-reinforcing because investors see share 
prices react to earnings information and thus equate this to a better guide to prices 
(Rappaport in [8]). Decisions on investment are thus not made on sound valuations. 
Comparative, rather than absolute, analysis of value can lead to inefficient allocation of 
capital. Graham et al conclude that, “Analysts are complicit in the earnings game” [5]. If 
firms fail to meet their predictions, they are embarrassed. They might also find it 
worthwhile to let a ‘bellwether’ stock (a single company stock that has an enormous 
influence on the direction of the market) beat the earnings estimate to reduce the risk of 
other stock prices in the industry falling and making their predictions for the other firms 
look bad [5]. Analysts prefer smooth earnings as it increases future predictability. Analysts 
typically do not incorporate long-term drivers of value, such as environmental performance, 
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in their analyses. They perceive that there is little demand for such analysis in the 
marketplace. However, in ignoring such factors they are ignoring important sources of risk. 
The first project focus group commented that by focusing only on short-term issues, analysts 
are potentially overlooking important information. This could lead to them missing sources 
of value, misallocating capital and underestimating the impacts of issues like climate change 
that will become increasingly important. 
As discussed below, analyst preferences impact significantly on corporate decision-making. 
Survey evidence shows that “CFOs view institutional investors, followed by analysts, as the 
most important marginal investors in their stock ... Individual investors are a distant third.” 
[5]. 
5.3 The corporate link 
As discussed above, corporate executives (CFOs) are often willing to sacrifice potential long-
term investment benefit to meet short-term earnings targets and to achieve smooth earnings. 
The research by Graham et al demonstrates that long-term investment, such as research and 
development, is foregone in preference for short-term strategies, such as cost cutting 
measures. 
The first project focus group discussed the notion that corporate managers operate in, and 
accept, a culture in which short-term earnings are all-important. This leads them to make 
decisions with positive short-term returns, even if long-term returns are potentially greater. 
Companies are perceived to be in a predicament. They are reluctant to allocate capital to 
address long-term issues because they are concerned that the market won’t welcome such 
decisions. Yet, they recognise the importance of addressing the issues. Participants had 
mixed views on the willingness and preparedness of management to discuss long-term 
issues with investors. 
Research provides evidence of the underlying reasons for such behaviour: 
Rules of the game 
Working within the system, corporate executives recognise “rules of the game” that 
influence their decision-making. The study by Graham et al identifies these rules as [5]: 
(i) “the stock market values predictability of earnings because market participants 
hate the uncertainty created by a firm failing to hit the earnings benchmark or by 
earnings that are not sufficiently smooth; 
(ii) there is a widely held belief that every firm manages earnings to hit targets, so if 
one firm does not manage and misses a target, it will get punished; 
(iii) because everybody manages earnings, if a firm misses a benchmark, it likely has 
revealed previously hidden problems at the firm, which worsens the perception 
of future growth prospects; 
(iv) managers try to maximize smoothness in earnings—volatile earnings are bad 
because they convey higher risk and/or lower growth prospects; and 
(v) firms should voluntarily disclose market-moving information because doing so 
results in lower information risk.” 
Manager motivation 
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Given the perceived rules, it is hardly surprising that managers take actions to meet short-
term targets even at the expense of long-term value. The research found that managers are 
motivated to maximise short-term earnings to [5]: 
 Build credibility with the market;  
 Maintain or increase stock price;  
 Improve the external reputation of the management team, which helps provide personal 
career protection and opens opportunities outside the firm; and 
 Convey future growth prospects – a strong share price is perceived to indicate a healthy, 
successful organisation 
Managers may also be risk averse and prefer to deal with the certainties associated with the 
short-term rather than rely on less comprehensive information to take risks on long-term 
projects. 
The importance of stock price 
Stock price is of particular concern to CFOs because [5]: 
 They believe that short-run stock price affects the cost of capital 
 They are subject to job insecurity if the stock price falls 
 They think the labour market assesses their skill based on short-run stock prices 
 They seek to attract equity analysts to cover their stock 
 They seek to avoid embarrassing inquisitions by stock analysts if the stock price falls 
Fear of takeover is a further strong incentive for managers to maintain their share price in 
the short-term. If a company does not act in the interests of its shareholders, it can risk being 
acquired by a stronger organisation. “Companies place a premium on stable cash flows, 
high security and high returns to pay high dividends to shareholders in order to secure the 
firm against predatory take-over” [8]. 
The first project focus group discussed the nature and source of signals received by 
corporate managers. Companies receive signals from two main sources – analysts and 
corporate governance channels i.e. investors. It was suggested that the analyst signal is 
drowning out other signals and boards perceive analysts as effectively setting their share 
prices in the market. Companies are also affected by day traders, with whom they do not 
have time to communicate. Companies are concerned about their share price due to take-
over vulnerability and the need to access capital at reasonable rates of interest. 
Performance assessment and remuneration  
Job protection, linked to near-term performance, is a high priority for managers. One way to 
ensure job security is to excel in performance appraisals, however, these “are focused on 
single, short-term monetary measures of business performance, such as divisional income, 
product contribution margin and cost reduction. This leads to data manipulation.” [23].  
The shareholder value-based model has changed the way corporate managers are rewarded. 
Salary packages moved towards remuneration based on stock options. Options are criticised 
for fixating managers on short-term performance, while not exposing them to the downside 
risk of management actions, thereby not fully aligning their interests with those of 
shareholders. 
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The focus group discussed the mismatch between the need for corporate executives to take a 
long-term approach, as they make risk judgements and take decisions with long-term 
implications, and remuneration structures that reward executives for short-term 
performance. Executives have higher earning potential from short-term rather than long-
term reward structures and their performance assessment is based on narrow financial and 
operational measures. 
Leadership 
The phenomenon of executive churn has implications for the short- and long-term success of 
a company. CEOs tend to be exalted by the market, to the point where an incoming our 
outgoing CEO can have a marked effect on the short-term share price. CEOs also typically 
have short-term tenures (four to five years) and so tend to have little interest in the long 
term success of the company [13]. The CFA Institute notes however, that the actions and 
decisions of CEOs have consequences much longer than the length of their tenure [7] which, 
in Australia, is an average of 4.4 years, almost half the average of their overseas peers [24]. 
The research by Graham et al also points to the position of the CFO in the internal power 
relations of the firm. This is dependent on the traditions and culture of the particular firm. 
Numerous writers refer to the polarised domains of strategic managers, informed by 
sociological and cultural theory, and CFOs whose decision-making is informed by the 
rational classic economics model [18]. 
Top management styles also have a significant influence on lower management (a ‘distant 
leadership’ effect). Marginson and McAulay indicate that trade-off decisions at lower 
management levels in favour of the short-term closely match those of top management [3]. 
Therefore, the short-term outlook of corporate leaders can impact on the decision-making of 
lower management. 
6 Conclusion 
Short-termism in the finance sector is a complex and multi-faceted issue that has developed 
over time. There are contributory factors at the global, institutional, organisational and 
individual levels 
On a broad scale, institutional factors, such as short-term political cycles, influence the 
financial markets as both are intertwined. Changes to the way business is run over the last 
thirty years have also contributed to short-termism.  
This research has identified key systemic factors as: 
 Disclosure and reporting requirements and practices; 
 Regulation and policy; 
 Market drivers such as the rise of speculative investment; 
 Insufficient financial education; and 
 Societal and behavioural factors such as increasing short-termism in society generally. 
Within organisations, there are pressures to conform to the existing system. At the level of 
individual links in the chain, job insecurity and performance assessment and reward 
mechanisms contribute significantly to myopic behaviour. Short-termism is self-reinforcing, 
with each link in the chain exerting short-term pressure on other links in the chain. 
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